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killed while on the job as a consequence of which claims were
advanced against the State of Illinois, by the dependent widow,
for workmen's compensation and also for pension benefits under
the state retirement system. 53 The state honored both demands,
but took credit, pursuant to law, 54 on the pension claim for
the amount paid by way of workmen's compensation benefits. It
thereafter intervened, in a wrongful death action brought by the
administrator of the deceased employee against the negligent
third person, to enforce a lien against the proceeds of that suit
to secure reimbursement for the amount so paid out. 5 5 Both the
trial court and the Supreme Court denied a right to a lien on the
ground that the state had, by its election to reduce the primary
obligation to pay pension benefits, lost the privilege of subrogation
afforded by the Workmen's Compensation Act. To hold otherwise would have given the state duplicate credits against both its
secondary and its primary liability.
III. CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
AVAILABILITY

OF REMEDIES

Two important decisions relating to the jurisdiction of inferior Illinois courts were produced by the Illinois Supreme Court
during the survey period. In the first, that of Turnbaugh v.
Dunlop,' the court placed a sharp limitation on, if not virtually
reversing, the holding in Werner v. Illinois Central Railroad
Company.2 The last mentioned case had declared that an Illinois
city court was without jurisdiction to entertain a transitory tort
cause of action arising beyond the municipal limits for the reason
that it was a court "in and for" the city. On the basis of certain
amendments which had been made in the statute since that decision, the Supreme Court, through the medium of the Turnbaugh
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 138 et seq., and Vol. 2, Ch. 127, § 215 et seq.
Ibid., Ch. 127, § 225.
55 Ibid., Ch. 48, § 166, provides a lien in favor of an employer who has paid a
compensation award.
1406 Ill. 573, 94 N. E. (2d) 438 (1950), noted in 39 Ill. B. J. 305.
2379 Ill. 559, 42 N. E. (2d) 82 (1942). The decision interpreted.Ill. Rev. Stat.
1941, Ch. 37, § 333.
53
54
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case, took the position that, so long as proper personal jurisdiction
could be obtained, city courts had been empowered to entertain
transitory proceedings no matter where they arose. On the basis
of that holding, it was almost inevitable that the Supreme Court
should reverse the decision of the Appellate Court for the First
Distriat in United Biscwit Company of America v. Voss Truck
Lines, Inc.,4 and it did, in fact, do so. The holding therein freed
the Municipal Court of the City of Chicago from hampering limitations which the Appellate Court had imposed on its right to
entertain transitory civil causes arising elsewhere. Both types
of courts may now entertain such suits provided it is possible to
serve original process within the city boundaries. 5
Next in importance to jurisdiction in terms of power to hear
and determine is that aspect of jurisdiction referred to as venue.
The significance of giving close attention to the factual bases for
venue allegations is illustrated in Dever v. Bowers,6 a wrongful
death action based on a collision which had occurred on a county
line road. The suit was begun in the county wherein the collision
supposedly had occurred but the proof showed that, in fact, the
defendant's car had crossed the center line of the highway and
that the collision actually occurred in the adjoining county. Institution of the suit in the first county would have been improper,
except for the supposed collision occurring therein, for the defendants were non-residents of that county. 7 The defendants, under
3 It is not clear how the court found the amended statute to be constitutional in
the face of the same limiting phrase concerning courts "in and for" cities set forth
in Ill. Const. 1870, Art. 6, § 1, but it professed to be able to do so.
4407 Ill. 488, 95 N. E. (2d) 439 (1950), reversing 340 Ill. App. 503, 92 N. E. (2d)
478 (1950), noted in 39 Ill. B. J. 353. The holding of the Appellate Court had been
criticized in 28 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REvIEw 246-53.
5 Subject to referendum, the legislature has authorized the Municipal Court of
Chicago to accept jurisdiction, in fourth class cases "for the recovery of money
only," up to a limit of $5,000, although the standard jurisdictional figure of $1,000
still remains as to other types of fourth class actions. See Laws 1951, p. 1726, H.B.
1188; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 37, § 357. There would now appear to be a
conflict between the first and fourth class actions for the statutory definition of the
former has been left to read ". . . all actions on contracts, express or implied . . .
"
when the amount claimed ... exceeds one thousand dollars ($1,000) ....
6341 Ill. App. 444, 94 N.
REvixw 191.

E.

(2d)

518

(1950), noted in 29 CHICAGO-KENT LAW

7 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 131, fixes venue in transitory actions
in the county of the defendant's residence or in the county where the transaction,
or some part thereof, occurred.
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an answer in the form of a categorical denial of the several
allegations of the complaint, sought to avoid a judgment entered
against them on the claim that the trial court was without jurisdiction because of the error relating to venue. The judgment
was affirmed, however, when the Appellate Court for the Fourth
District, recognizing the right of a defendant to raise error in
venue by proper means, held that the form of the answer used
had not put the question of venue at issue, hence had resulted in
a waiver of any error.8 It is not necessary for venue purposes,
according to Schmelzle v. TransportationInvestment Corporation,9
that the entire sequence of events be placed within the county
wherein the suit is instituted for the Civil Practice Act would
be satisfied if "some part thereof" arose in that county. 10 The
case was one in which an accommodation endorser sued the maker
of a negotiable instrument. It was held proper to deny a motion
questioning the correctness of venue when it appeared that the
plaintiff had (1) endorsed the check, (2) honored it on default
of the maker, and (3) had received the instrument itself after
default all within the county of suit, since these factors represented substantial parts of the "transaction" out of which the
cause of action arose. The fact that the defendant had no office
or registered agent in the county and had not, personally, transacted any business there was held to be immaterial.
There will also be occasion, in the conduct of litigation, to
give heed to matters relating to the power of a court to exercise
jurisdiction over the parties. Although the decision has now
probably been rendered sterile by the passage of time, it is
worthy of note that, in Sanders v. Pollock," the court held the
1949 amendment to the statute relating to service of process on
motorists involved in highway collisions within the state was not
retroactive in operation, so could not be applied to support service on a former resident who, prior to suit, had departed from the
8 Ibid., § 135.
9 341 11. App. 682, 94 N. E.

(2d) 682 (1950).

10 11. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 131.
11342 Ill. App. 701, 97 N. E.

Rmviw 359.

(2d)

600 (1951),

noted in

29 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
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state. The amendment does, however, cure at least one serious
defect in the Illinois law on the point. 12 The same general purpose of aiding in the acquisition of personal jurisdiction may
also be seen evidenced in the passage of a statute relating to
service of process in cases arising out of the use of aircraft or
watercraft by non-residents or by those who may become such. 13
Where acquisition of jurisdiction by personal service of
process is not possible, and the action is of a type in which service
by publication would be permissible to support a decree affecting
the rights of a defendant, the attorney for the plaintiff is still
under an obligation to see to it that proper and adequate notice
is given, otherwise the decree may prove to be worthless. A statutory condition to service by publication, especially against a nonresident, is the filing of an affidavit of recent date, 14 which filing
shall occur subsequent to the institution of the suit and prior to
the publication of the notice. 15 Because the plaintiff, in Lakin
v. Wood, 1 6 had filed his affidavit of non-residence some eleven
days before the complaint had been placed on file, it was there
held proper to vacate a decree ordering specific performance of
a real estate contract 17 since jurisdiction over the defendant had
never been acquired. The court noted that no change had been
produced by anything in the Civil Practice Act in what had
8
been the former rule on the subject.'
12 There would seem to be occasion to consider the effect of the statute in a
situation where the non-resident motorist dies prior to suit and an attempt is made
to secure service on the non-resident administrator of his estate. In that regard,
see note in 28 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REvIEw 347-54, and the inference to be gleaned
from the holding in Smalley v. Hutcheson, 296 N. Y. 68, 70 N. E. (2d) 161 (1946),
which would appear to reflect an Illinois policy on the point.
13 Laws 1951, p. 1619, H. B. 653; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 263a et seq.
14 The court, in the instant case, held that an affidavit made more than ten days
before it was to be used as the basis of publication was not recent enough to serve
the purpose. It relied on Campbell v. McCahan, 41 Ill. 15 (1866), and on Foster v.
Illinski, 3 Ill. App. 345 (1879).
15 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 138.
16343 Ill. App. 372, 99 N. E. (2d) 401 (1951).
17 The court noted the action was begun prior to the 1949 amendment to Section 14 of the Civil Practice Act, which added specific performance suits to the
list of in rem proceedings there mentioned. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch.110,
§ 138. A point was raised in the case as to whether service by publication would
be adequate in specific performance proceedings, but no decision was made thereon
as the finding of a lack of fundamental jurisdiction cancelled the need for a consideration of other issues in the case.
is See Hodgen v. Guttery, 58 Ill. 431 (1871), and Hansen v. Klicka, 78 Ill. App.
177 (1898).
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Even though legal measures may not have been pursued
to acquire jurisdiction over the parties, a court may still end up
empowered to act for the essential jurisdiction may be conferred
upon it by acts or omissions of the parties. It is evident, from
the holding in Athens v. Ernst,19 that the attorney for the defendant should, prior to filing an appearance, resolve all questions on
the point as to whether or not the court has properly acquired
jurisdiction over the person of his client. If not, the proper
method of attack would require the use of a special appearance
accompanied by a proper motion or pleading addressed to the
jurisdictional point,20 otherwise the right to interpose an objection may be waived by the use of a general appearance. If, perchance, a general appearance is used, it may be a question whether
a court should, in the exercise of discretion, permit the withdrawal
thereof and the substitution of a limited appearance. According
to the holding in that case, the defendant would have no right, once
*he has had the advantage of his general appearance in the form
of several continuances granted at his request, to seek the withdrawal thereof and be permitted to file a special appearance. A
determination that a defendant should be so permitted was there
ordered reversed.
Little has been said of significance with respect to the availability of particular legal remedies to meet fact situations of
normal recurrence. It would hardly be thought at this late date,
however, that any court could be confused as to the essential allegations necessary to state a cause of action in the character of
trover, but such would appear to be the case, judging by the trial
court decision in Community Acceptance Corporationv. Falzone.21
A complaint filed by the holder of a conditional sales contract
covering an automobile there charged a conversion by the several
defendants in successively taking what amounted to second chattel
mortgages on the car and thereafter, on default, foreclosing the
19342 Ill. App. 357, 96 N. E. (2d) 643' (1950), noted in 29
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358.
20 The special appearance need not, as formerly was the case, be signed by the

defendant. It may be signed by counsel: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 144.
21 343 I1. App. 258, 98 N. E. (2d) 788 (1951).
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same and selling the car to third persons. Motions by the several
defendants to strike the individual portions of the complaint
relating to each for failure to charge a demand for the return of
the property and a refusal to surrender were sustained and the
suit was dismissed. The Appellate Court corrected the error by
pointing out, as has long been the law, 22 that a demand and a
refusal is but evidence of a conversion which may be proven in
other ways, and that a complaint charging a conversion in some
other form, as by an unauthorized sale of the article, is fully sufficient in law to state a cause of action.
Extra-ordinary remedies of the type such as a quo warranto
suit may customarily be utilized only by certain public officials
since the state is more than a nominal plaintiff thereunder. Statutory counterparts of these common law extra-ordinary remedies
are typically no different, except that the legislature may grant
to a private person, after suitable request or petition, leave to
24
institute such a suit. 23 Even so, according to Adair v. Williams,
the private person must be one "having an interest in the question on his own relation" before he may be permitted to sue. It
would not be enough, under the rule announced therein, if the
private person were no more than a taxpayer and a resident citizen
for he would then have no greater interest than one which would
be common to the public in general. Since the relator, there
seeking to question the validity of the formation of a municipality,
could show no better personal right, it was held proper to dismiss
25
the proceeding.
The interests which courts of equity, on the other hand, will
protect are variegated and manifold. Included among them are
interests in the maintenance of trade secrets. The case of James
v. Ulrich26 is, therefore, one worthy of notice. The plaintiff there
22 Hanchett v. Williams, 24 Il1. App. 56 (1887).
23 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 112, § 10.
24 407 Il. 309, 95 N. E. (2d) 345 (1950).
25 The court expressed the view that, despite the 1937 statute on the subject, the
situation was analogous to that which prior to then, required a special showing
to support mandamus to compel the proper public official to bring quo warranto
proceedings. The change in the statute, therefore, has accomplished no more than
to eliminate one, heretofore necessary, step.
26 342 Ill. App. 16, 95 N. E. (2d) 113 (1950).
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had developed a spreader attachment to be used in the spreading of
pulverulent materials. He orally licensed the defendant to manufacture and to sell spreader attachments embodying his idea and
later furnished him with printed circulars for distribution to the
trade and prospective purchasers. Although plaintiff subsequently terminated the oral licensing agreement, defendant continued to manufacture and to sell spreaders embodying the teachings imparted by plaintiff and even filed a patent application
thereon in his own name as sole inventor. The trial court granted
defendant's motion to dismiss a suit to enjoin such conduct but
the Appellate Court reversed. The defendant first argued that
the state court lacked jurisdiction as it was the province of
a federal court to determine patent rights.27 The court replied that
the mere fact that a patent was involved in a case did not oust a
state court from its jurisdiction for the power of a federal court
was exclusive only in a direct proceeding for infringement of a
patent. Where the question arises collaterally, it not only may
be determined by the state courts but, in the absence of diversity
of citizenship, must be so determined.
Defendant then relied on the proposition that the complaint
contained no allegation that the defendant had gained disclosure
of plaintiff's invention by any trick, artifice or fraud, nor was
there any statement of an agreement to keep the disclosure confidential. On finding that plaintiff had alleged a reliance on
defendant's skill-in welding and in the machinery repair business
and had employed defendant to construct the spreader after a
confidential disclosure of the details thereof, the court said a
confidential relationship had arisen under these facts, regardless
of the presence or absence of a contract, with a consequent duty
not to divulge the trade secret. It answered a further claim that
plaintiff had forfeited any right by personally publishing circulars
containing exterior views of the spreader with the statement that
the circulars were not distributed to the general public until after
27 35 U. S. C. A. § 31 et seq. He particularly relied on Section 48
"Every person who purchases of the inventor, or discoverer, or with
and consent constructs any newly invented or discovered machine .
the right to use, and vend to others to be used, the specific thing so
chased, without liability therefor."

which states:
his knowledge
. . shall have
made or pur-
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the disclosure of the trade secret to defendant. The defendant,
being burdened with the prior confidential disclosure, could not
therefore set up the subsequent publication, nor even an abandonment of the invention to the general public, as a means to escape
the consequences of the violation of the confidence reposed in him.
The court also stressed the thought that while an idea, to be protected, must be concrete to a degree, it did not have to be in a
tangible and material form to permit of its protection.
The sufficiency of the interest of a taxpayer to seek protection of public funds has also occupied the attention of equity
28
courts. In Golden v. City of Flora,
the Supreme Court declared
that a complaint by a taxpayer to restrain a city from carrying
out a collective bargaining agreement between it and the employees of a municipallly owned and operated light, water and
sewage disposal system should not be entertained because the alleged injury threatened merely public rights and did not affect
the plaintiff's personal interests. The plaintiff had sued in his
capacity as a taxpayer, but not as a consumer of the utility concerned, and had contended that the higher wage rates provided
for in the collective bargaining agreement would create an added
financial burden upon the taxpayers. It having been established
that the wages involved were to come from the revenue derived
by the utility and not from tax funds, the court declared that no
expenditure of tax funds was involved, hence there could be no
increase in tax liability.
An example of an application of the equitable doctrine of
laches may be encountered in the case of Lasky v. Smith.29 A
claimant of a trust in real property there asserted his interest only
after many years had elapsed and only after the sole witness
capable of denying his assertions had died. Moreover, he claimed
the trust against a person who had expended a considerable
amount of money on the property, including its redemption from
a tax foreclosure. The Supreme Court held that his suit was
properly dismissed because the claimant was guilty of laches in
asserting a trust for his benefit.
28408 I1. 129, 96 N. E. (2d) 506 (1951).

29 407 111. 97, 94 N. E. (2d) 898 (1950).
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Masters in chancery should take note of the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court, in the case of Handelman v.
Arquilla,3 when computing their statutory fees for cases heard
by them. The court indicated that the value of the property
which is the subject matter of the litigation should not constitute
an element for consideration in determining the compensation but
that the fee should be based upon the time necessarily devoted to
the work, the intricacy of the proof, and the complications of fact
and law involved in preparing the master's report. It was also
indicated that, as the master's position and responsibility are
inferior to those of the chancellor, the master's per diem compensation should, in any event, never equal or exceed the compensation of the judge when calculated on a similar basis.
A small point relating to equity practice, one dealing with the
issuance of an injunction without notice, 3 1 was made in the case
of Skarpinski v. Veterans of Foreign Wars.3 2 The Appellate
Court for the First District, adverting to its practice in relation
to ex parte appointments of receivers,"3 indicated that it frowned
on the practice particularly in cases where the name of opposing
counsel was known and a telephone call from the courtroom would
usually be sufficient to secure his presence in a few minutes. It
did not advocate the use of informal notice by telephone in all
cases, but expressed the belief, based on the experience of the
reviewing judges when sitting in chancery, that no serious delay
would occur, or substantial harm be done, in most cases if issuance
of the injunction was held up until some notice had been given.
PREPARATION OF PLEADINGS

Broad allegations in a complaint charging negligence are
desirable, from the plaintiff's standpoint, so as to permit every
possible advantage from the proof adduced at the trial. If the
defendant is not sufficiently informed thereby it would, seemingly,
30 407 Ill. 552, 95 N. E. (2d) 910 (1951).
31 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 69, § 3, while typically requiring notice of
application for an injunction, permits a court to act without notice on a proper
showing where the rights of the plaintiff would be unduly prejudiced by delay.
32343 Ill. App. 271, 98 N. E. (2d) 858 (1951).

33 See, for example, Nusbaum v. Locke, 53 I1. App. 242 (1893).
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be up to him to move to have the complaint made more specific
and certain, 4 for there does not appear to be any requirement
in the Civil Practice Act, other than the one that the complaint
should contain a "plain and concise statement" of the cause of
action, that the plaintiff should affirmatively plead matters likely
to take the defendant by surprise although the defendant is re35
quired to plead matters of that kind affirmatively in his answer
For these reasons, it was held proper, in the case of Fox v. Hopkins,3 6 to permit plaintiff to prove that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the automobile collision in question under a
complaint charging a negligent and careless failure to keep a
proper lookout, despite a claim of surprise, even though the defendant, without an affirmative answer, would probably not be
permitted to show the same thing on plaintiff's part.3 7 As the
defendant had also pleaded guilty to a charge of drunken driving,
it could hardly be said that he was "surprisea" by the offer of
proof although a person reading the complaint would suspect that
nothing of that nature had occurred.
Notice was taken last year of the holding of the Appellate
Court for the First District in the case of Hayes v. Chicago
Transit Authority,8 which dealt with the sufficiency of the notice
and the adequacy of the allegation relating thereto in a complaint
in a personal injury suit against the Chicago transportation system. It would appear, from the facts noted in the opinion, that
the plaintiff in Schuman v. Chicago Transit Authority 9 had been
trapped into a similar failure to comply with the notice provision
of the statute relating to that enterprise, 40 believing that the
submission of an accident report was sufficient for that purpose.
When the complaint there was stricken for failure to set forth
the customary allegation as to notice, plaintiff amended the com34

Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 169(1).

35 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 157(1), and § 167(4).

36343 Ill. App. 404, 99 N. E. (2d) 363 (1951).
37 An abstract opinion in Blake v. Ewers, 341 11.
App. 382, 91 N. E. (2d) 75
(1950), would purport to so hold.
38340 Ill. App. 375, 92 N. E. (2d) 174 (1950), noted in 29 CmicAGo-KENT LAW
Rmvmw 44.
39407 Ill. 313, 95 N. E. (2d) 447 (1950).
40 111. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 111-2/3, § 341.
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plaint by admitting the non-compliance but challenging the validity
of the statutory provision on the ground that it constituted special
legislation in violation of the state constitution. 41 Both the trial
court and the Supreme Court, however, held the section constitutional by reason of the close relationship it bears to the
notice provisions applicable to cities and villages. 42 The pleader
must, therefore, model a complaint against the transit authority
on the lines heretofore used in suits against municipalities.
The old question as to whether only a special prayer for
relief or a special request for judgment is to be permitted in
43
Illinois will not down, despite statutory language on the point,
perhaps because the bar has a predeliction for the use of older
forms and no one has yet seen fit to make a special issue on the
point. Courts, too, are apparently satisfied with older forms
of general prayers for relief if the outcome of the case of David
v. Ridgely-Farmers Safe Deposit Company44 is at all illustrative.
The court there specifically found that plaintiff was not entitled
to the particular relief he had sought but nevertheless affirmed
the decree granted in his favor because the relief which had been
granted came within the scope of a general prayer for relief which
the plaintiff, thoughtfully or otherwise, had added to his complaint.
Some points have also been made with regard to defensive
pleadings. It is the spirit of the Civil Practice Act that pleadings
should accurately reflect only the seriously disputed issues between the parties in order that cases may be "speedily and finally
determined according to the substantive rights of the parties. "45
To that end, Section 41 of the statute was intended to penalize
the pleader who, by allegations and denials made without reasonIll. Const. 1870, Art. 4, § 22.
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 1-11. See also Condon v. City of Chicago,
249 Ill. 596, 94 N. E. 976 (1911).
43 Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 15S.
44342 Ii1. App. 96, 95 N. E. (2d) 725 (1950). Leave to appeal has been denied.
45 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 128. In that connection, see the comment
of Schwartz, P. J., in Midwest Transfer Co. v. Preferred Ace. Ins. Co., 342 Ill.
App. 231, 96 N. E. (2d) 228 (1951), on a "melange of pleadings, motions for
summary judgment, motions to strike, counterclaims . . . and technical objections
and arguments tending to obscure a simple question and frustrate a just solution."
41

42
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able cause, and found to be untrue, forced his opponent to unnecessary effort to overcome the untruthful pleading. 46 The case
of Adams v. Silfen,4 7 however, indicates that a request for the
imposition of penalties should be made to the trial judge, at the
time of trial, and then only upon notice. It was there held error
to make the application long after the hearing and on an ex parte
request to another judge, particularly since the section is somewhat penal in character.
Particularity in pleading is highly desirable in order that both
opposing parties and the trial court may know what the controverted issues are. This principle is even the more important when
a motion has been made to strike a complaint for, if specification
be made, the plaintiff might voluntarily amend and save judicial
time in the hearing of such a motion. If hearing should become
necessary, it would then be possible to confine the argument to the
precise defects urged to exist in the motion so specifying. It was
precisely for this reason that the Appellate Court for the First
District, in Gulf, Mobile & Ohio Railroad Company v. Arthur
Dixon Transfer Company,48 reversed a judgment which, on motion
to strike the complaint, had dismissed the suit. The motion, on
inspection, was found to amount to no more than a common law
demurrer, totally lacking in that degree of specification required
by Section 45 of the Civil Practice Act.49 The court turned back
defendant's argument that it was not possible to specify wherein
a complaint failed to state a cause of action, other than by so stating, by pointing to the fact that defendant's brief listed some five
points in support of the trial court holding, any one of which would
have served the purpose of providing the necessary elaboration
required in the motion.
The Civil Practice Act also permits the use not only of a
46 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 165.
47342 Il. App. 415, 96 N. E. (2d) 628 (1951), noted in 29 CHIcAGO-KENT LAW
277.
48343 Ill. App. 148, 98 N. E. (2d) 783 (1951).
49 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 169. It is interesting to note the development of a practice of filing a counter motion, by plaintiff, to strike the defendant's
motion to strike the complaint because of defendant's non-compliance with the
statute. This multiplication of pleading documents should be unnecessary since, if
defendant's motion is inadequate, it should be denied.
REVIEW
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motion analogous to the common law demurrer but one closely
akin to a "speaking" demurrer. The latter, however, is to be
utilized only where some ground of the type enumerated in the
statute is reflected on the face of the pleadings or can be made
to appear through the use of affidavits. In connection therewith,
the decision in Duvardo v. Moore5" would tend to indicate that
the Appellate Court for the Fourth District persists in its belief
that a motion pursuant to Section 48 of the Civil Practice Act5 '
is a proper way to raise a question as to whether or not an employee who is under the Workmen's Compensation Act has a
right to maintain a common law action against the third person
who has caused his injury.5 2 It was there held proper, on such a
motion, to dismiss the suit brought by the employee on the
theory that he had not the "capacity to sue." 3 An illustration
of what would seem to be the preferred way to proceed, although
the court said nothing in that regard because no question had been
5 4
raised, may be found in the case of Petrazelliv. Propper
wherein
the issue was raised by answer and reply rather than by motion. 55
THE TRIAL OF THE CASE

A slight addition to the Jurors Act, made by the legislature,
may prove to be a boon in more ways than one in connection with
the trial of cases. It will now be permissible, subject to the consent of the presiding judge of the court in which the jurors were
summoned to appear, to have an interchange of petit jurors
through the loan of the services thereof to other courts of record
sitting in the same county, at least during the period for which
50343 Ii.

App. 304, 98 N. E.

(2d)

855 (1951).

51 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 172(c).
52 An employer who has paid compensation may, under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1,
Ch. 48, § 138.5(b), bring a direct action for reimbursement against the third person.
53 The case conforms to its earlier holding in Classen v. Heil, 330 Ill. App. 433,
71 N.

E.

(2d)

537 (1947).

But see a criticism thereof in

26 CHICAGO-KENT LAW

REvrEw 38-9.
54409 Ill. 365, 99 N. E. (2d) 140 (1951). The court, incidentally, there held
former Section 29 of the Workmen's Compensation Act to be constitutional, and
applicable, In a case brought against another employer who personally drove the
truck in question and who was, as an employer of others, under the statute.
55 See post, note 70, for mention of an amendment made by the legislature to
Section 48 of the Civil Practice Act.
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the jurors were summoned to appear for service. 56 Not only
should the practice result in some reduction of expense to the
taxpayers but there should also be a speeding up in the trial of
cases as the increase in the size of the pool of available jurors
should make it unnecessary to delay the commencement of one
trial until an earlier one has been completely disposed of.5 7
Once a trial has been begun, it is the obvious purpose of the
Civil Practice Act to require that the matter should proceed
to completion for serious limitations have been imposed, by
Section 52 thereof, on the right to take a non-suit. 58 That right,
in former days, could have been exercised without any limitation
whatever up until the moment of final judgment and was so
frequently utilized to the point where it became an effective
frustration of the cause of justice. There is evidence, in certain
of the cases decided since the adoption of the Civil Practice Act,
that courts will be unwilling to permit a voluntary non-suit except
on compliance with statutory terms. Further emphasis has now
been added by the holding in Gilbert v. Langbein. 59 The court
there held it proper, after a jury had been sworn and an opening
statement made, to deny a motion for a voluntary dismissal, provoked by the absence of plaintiff and plaintiff's witnesses, inasmuch as (1) the motion was orally made when it should have
been in writing, and (2) was lacking in the essential affidavit disclosing adequate grounds.
Courts have frequently had occasion to comment on the practice, in personal injury cases, of plaintiffs seeking to convey information, by various means, that a given defendant carries
Laws 1951, p. 1357, H. B. 201: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 78, § 12a.
Expansion of the official court reporter system is also likely to occur from
the fact of two other amendments which now permit the judges of county and
probate courts, in those counties where the population ranges from 70,000 to 500,000,
to make official appointments of that character. The population limitation, prior
to amendment, stood at 70,000 to 200,000 persons. See Laws 1951, p. 1476, S. B.
420, as to county courts, and p. 1475, S. B. 74, as to probate courts. The amendments also appear in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 37, § 330 and § 322, respectively.
58 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 176.
59 343 Ill. App. 132, 98 N. E. (2d) 140 (1951). See also Glick v. Glick, 338 Ill.
App. 637, 88 N. E. (2d) 509 (1949) ; Bernick v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 325 I1.
App. 495, 60 N. E. (2d) 442 (1945); Gunderson v. First National Bank, 296 Ill.
App. 111, 16 N. E. (2d) 306 (1938).
56
57
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insurance.6 0 The converse of that situation arose, in Humkey v.
Huesimann Quarry, Inc.,6 wherein the defendant, by way of opening statement to the jury, mentioned the fact that "there is no
insurance in this case." Despite objection and motion for mistrial, the court permitted the case to proceed and a verdict for
defendant was obtained. A judgment based on that verdict was
reversed because it was said to be equally improper for plaintiff
to inform a jury of the presence of insurance or for defendant
to dwell on the absence thereof.
In two cases decided within the past year, the Illinois Supreme Court had occasion to balance the persuasive power of
expert testimony against testimony given by eyewitnesses. Quite
properly, but also as might have been forecast in this state, the
experts lost the round. In the first of these two cases, that of
Jones v. Jones.62 one which involved the genuineness of the testator's signature on a will, the experts claimed a forgery in spite
of direct testimony of two apparently credible eye-witnesses to
the contrary. Under these circumstances, the expert opinion was
63
of almost no moment. In the second, that of Witt v. Panek,
decided shortly thereafter, the facts were more complex and
there was more room for a difference of opinion. In this instance,
the signature to a deed was questioned. There was testimony
that the grantor's signature had been executed by a "guided
hand," i. e., the grantor held the pen while the assistant aided
and supported his hand. A notary public, before whom the grantor
had purportedly acknowledged his signature, repudiated his notarial certificate and testified that the grantor had not appeared
before him but that the deed had been signed before it had been
brought to the notary public for acknowledgment. Despite the
testimony of experts who, on these facts, had considerable basis
to suspect the genuineness of the signature, the Supreme Court
held that the burden of proof as to forgery had not been sus60 See, for example, Smithers v. Henriquez, 368 Ill. 588, 15 N. E. (2d) 499 (1938),
noted in 16 CHICAGO-KENT RviEmw 371, and cases subsequent thereto.
61343 Ill. App. 377, 99 N. E. (2d) 351 (1951).
448, 94 N. E. (2d) 314 (1950).
62406 Ill.
63 408 Ill. 328, 97 N. E. (2d) 283 (1951).
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tained. In the background on both decisions lies an evident belief
that expert opinion is "secondary" evidence at best, often purchased for the occasion, which, when opposed by the direct testimony of credible witnesses, must give way to more persuasive
evidence.
Three changes in the law of evidence were made at the last
session of the legislature. A new provision, added to the chapter
on employment, provides that whenever, in any proceeding under
the act, testimony has been taken, or a final decision has been
rendered, and thereafter the injured employee dies then, in any
subsequent proceeding brought by the personal representative or
by beneficiaries of the deceased employee, such testimony "may
be introduced with the same force and effect as though the witness . . . were present in person." 64 While the new provision
would seem eminently fair and should operate to keep vital
evidence available which, but for the provision, would be lost,
the interpretation and application to be given to the statute
in the future should prove interesting. A minor change in the
Evidence Act has been made in order to make the language thereof
uniform with that found in the statute dealing with conservators 6 5
Still another, one relating to book accounts, eliminates the qualification on the use of entries which have been photographed or
microfilmed if the entries have been photographed or microfilmed
"pursuant to any statute of this state authorizing the reproduction of public records, papers, or documents." ' 6
It was the evident intention of the Supreme Court, at the time
of promulgating Rule 22, to avoid circuity of procedure in relation to post-trial motions for it there required the filing of an
alternative motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or
for a new trial and required the trial court to enter alternative
orders thereon so that judgment, in whatever form should prove
proper, could be entered on appeal. The same rule also states
Laws 1951, p. 1060, H. B. 1253; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 138.19(j).
65 Laws 1951, p. 1559, H. B. 244; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 51, § 2. The
change eliminated the words "idiot, lunatic, or distracted person," and substituted
the phrase "a person who is mentally ill or mentally deficient," being the same as
that used in ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 265.
66 Laws 1951, p. 1331, H. B. 740; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 51, § 3.
64
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that a person "who fails to file a motion for new trial
shall be deemed to have waived the right to apply for a new
trial. '16 For these reasons, plaintiff contended, in Palmer v.
Loveless,68 that defendant's failure to file his motion for a new
trial and his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
simultaneously precluded the reviewing court from reversing a
judgment for defendant notwithstanding the verdict and directing
a new trial of the issue. It did appear, however, that while the
defendant's motion for new trial had not been filed until several
days after the motion n. o. v., it was on file before the trial court
had had time to rule on the questions presented by the earlier
motion. The Appellate Court for the Third District, therefore,
concluded the inadvertent delay was not fatal.6 9
Some points have also been made with regard to the judgment order or decree that is to be entered by the trial court. In
the first place, the day of the unexpected and unanticipated default judgment, either on motion under Section 48 of the Civil
Practice Act or because of a failure to prosecute or defend after
the case has reached the trial calendar, would seem to have come
to an end. The legislature, by suitable change in two sections
of the Civil Practice Act and by the addition of another section 0
has forbidden all courts operating under that statute from taking
an ex parte action to (1) grant a motion, (2) enter a judgment
or decree, or (3) dismiss a case for want of prosecution, unless
and until the clerk of the court has given five days notice of the
intended action to every attorney of record, which notice may be
sent by first class mail. The affidavit of the clerk in relation
thereto is declared to be sufficient evidence of the fact of such
notice.
Secondly, lacking any Illinois Supreme Court decision on the
See also Todd v. S. S. Kresge
67 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 259.22.
Co., 384 Ill. 524, 52 N. E. (2d) 206 (1944).
68 342 Ill. App. 60, 95 N. E. (2d) 104 (1950).
69 The common law rule would have been to the contrary, treating the delay as
a waiver of the right to seek a new trial; Bepley v. State, 4 Ind. 264, 58 Am. Dec.
628 (1853).
70 Laws 1951, p. 1707, H. B. 971; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 172, § 174
(6), and § 174a, respectively.
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point,71 the Appellate Court for the Second District had to determine for itself the legal significance of an order dismissing an
equity proceeding "with prejudice," when asked to rule on the
correctness of the trial court's action in dismissing a claim in the
case of In re Crane's Estate.72 It appeared that, in an earlier
equity suit between the parties, after an extended course of pleadings and amended pleadings, the plaintiff failed to file an amended
complaint within the time directed, for which reason the suit was
dismissed "with prejudice." Without appealing from that order,
the plaintiff then filed a claim against the now deceased defendant's estate, which claim rested on the same general ground
previously used to support' the equity case. The court found that
the dismissal of the equity suit "with prejudice" was the equivalent of a finding that the suit, as disclosed by the pleadings
therein, was without merit and, such being the case, it operated,
by reason of doctrines relating to res judicata, to support the
subsequent dismissal of the claim against the estate.
The third point deals with the form the judgment should take,
in law actions, when multiple plaintiffs sue. Although there is
ample provision in the Civil Practice Act, in the interest of the
expedition of litigation, for the presentation of a number of
separate claims held by distinct plaintiffs in the one suit, provided
the several claims arose out of the same transaction or involved
common questions of law or fact, 73 it was never contemplated
that the composite law suit should result in the presentation of
7
one mass claim for a blanket sum leading to but one judgment. 4
It was, therefore, held to be error, in Caton v. Flig,75 for the trial
court to submit the several issues relating to the cases of the
joined plaintiffs to a jury under one blanket verdict and to render
one lump-sum judgment thereon when the several claims were
of contractual character, 76 regardless of what the rule might be
71 The only related case would seem to be that of Bank of America v. Jorjorian,
303 Ill. App. 184, 24 N. E. (2d) 896 (1940).
72 343 11. App. 327, 99 N. E. (2d) 204 (1951). Leave to appeal has been denied.
73 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 147.
74 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 174, authorizes the entry of more than one judgment in a
case.
75 343 Il. App. 99, 98 N. E. (2d) 162 (195i).
76 Lacking Illinois precedent, the court relied on the case of Musto v. Mitchell,
105 N. J. L. 5.75, 146 A. 212 (1929)..
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as to cases involving joint tort feasors. 77 The trial attorney
should, therefore, prepare separate forms of verdicts in advance
for use in such cases and the judge should pronounce separate
judgments thereon.
DAMAGES

When the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal in the case
of New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad Company v. American
Transit Lines, Inc., 78 it elected to examine into the proposition
as to whether or not a claim for damages arising by the tort of
two or more joint tort feasors could be reduced by the amount
paid by one of them for a covenant not to sue. Noting its approval of the earlier Appellate Court holding in Aldridge v.
Morris, 79 the upper court held that the trial court had the right,
after determining liability, to grant a credit against the amount
of plaintiff's damages equal to the sum so paid. About the same
time, the trial court, in Hyde v. Montgomery Ward & Company,
Inc., 0 denied defendant's tendered offer of proof, in a case tried
before a jury, concerning the amount which plaintiff had already
received by way of consideration for a covenant not to sue a third
person involved in the cause there concerned. In much the same
way, the trial judge rejected a petition, filed after trial, to grant
credit against the verdict.8 ' The Appellate Court, one judge dissenting, reversed the cause for a new trial on the ground that it
82 was error to refuse to permit the jury to consider such evidence.
77 On that point, see Stoewsand v. Checker Taxi Co., 331 Ill. App. 192, 73 N. E.
(2d) 4 (1947), but compare with Shaw v. Courtney, 317 Ill. App. 422, 46 N. E.
(2d) 170 (1943), noted in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 249, and the cautionary
comment of the Illinois Supreme Court, when affirming the holding therein, set out
in 385 I1. 559 at 565, 53 N. E. (2d) 432 at 435 (1944).
78408 Ill. 338, 97 N. E. (2d) 264 (1951), noted in 29 CHIcAGo-KENT LAW REVIEw
360, in part affirming 339 Ill. App. 282, 89 N. E. (2d) 858 (1950).
79337 Ill. App. 369, 86 N. E. (2d) 143 (1949), noted in 27 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEw 313.
Wheat, J., wrote a dissenting
80343 I1. App. 388, 99 N. E. (2d) 382 (1951).
opinion.
81 It appeared that the sum in question had been paid for covenants executed by
both plaintiff and his wife, also injured at the same time, covering both personal
injury and property damage claims. Plaintiff urged that no credit should be
granted as it was impossible to fix the amount to be allocated to plaintiff's personal
injury claim. The Appellate Court indicated that it was up to the jury to determine the part of the payment which related to the suit in question.
82 The burden of the dissent was to the effect that the rule of the Aldridge case
should be confined to suits based on liquidated claims as it could lead to ridiculous
results when damages were, as here, of unliquidated character.
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By contrast, in Smith v. Medendorp, 3 it was held proper to
exclude any consideration of the question of mitigation of damages, growing out of a covenant not to sue, because the issue was
not raised by the defendant until he presented his motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The Appellate Court for
the Third District, not then too sure of the fundamental legal rule
to apply,8 4 indicated that the issue had to be raised at the trial
or, at least, not later then a motion for new trial. If a plaintiff
does not, in his complaint, acknowledge the giving of the covenant and the amount received therefor, it would seem as if the
8 5
defendant should create the issue in his answer.
The measure of damage inflicted by the negligent causing of
harm to structures forming a part of real property may be
calculated, if such structures are not totally destroyed, on the
basis of the cost of repairing the same. 6 Where total destruction occurs, however, the plaintiff is limited to a recovery based on
the difference in the market value of the land before and after
the negligent total destruction. 7 It was for this latter reason
that the judgment in the case of Johnson v. Pagel Clikeman Coinpaniy, Inc.,"" was reversed. Plaintiff had there been allowed to
prove the replacement cost of a barn there totally destroyed by a
fire negligently set by defendant's employees. In commenting
on the issue, the court noted, as a matter of judicial knowledge,
that one driving through the country would "frequently observe
old and dilapidated buildings, especially large old barns" that
were practically worthless but still being put to use. The owners
thereof, said the court, could not contend they had been damaged "to the amount that it would cost to replace" such old
structures for, in many cases, "it would cost ten times as much
to replace" them than they were actually worth.
343 Ill. App. 512, 99 N. E. (2d) 571 (1951).
The opinion was written by Wheat, J., who later wrote the dissenting opinion
in the Hyde case noted above at footnote 80, ante.
85 The defense, if not strictly one of "payment," could at least be said to be of
the character likely to "take the opposite party by surprise" within the meaning
of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 167.
86 Donk Bros. Coal & Coke Co. v. Novero, 135 Ill. App. 633 (1907).
87 Clark v. Public Service Co., 278 Ill. App. 426 (1935).
88 343 Ill. App. 346, 99 N. E. (2d) 148 (1951).
83
84
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It had previously been noticed that a minor, suing for personal injuries, might recover such damage elements as probable
future medical expenses and loss of potential earning power,
despite the fact of minority, if the parent would give a formal
written assignment to the child's guardian of all such claims 9
The case of Fox v. Hopkins9" now indicates that the same rule
applies, by way of estoppel, where a parent gues as next friend
and then later permits the child, on becoming of age, to take control of the case and to carry on with the litigation after a suitable
amendment of the pleadings.
One legislative change has been made relating to the measure of damages recoverable for a wrongful death. The maximum
recovery, for all deaths occurring after the effective date of the
amended statute, is now $20,000 in lieu of the $15,000 sum fixed
by the 1947 amendment. 91 In making the change, the legislature
took cognizance of the uncertainty it had created by the prior law,
as to whether or not the change applied to all pending claims or
only to wrongs committed thereafter,9 2 by specifying that the
former maximum figure applies to all deaths occurring prior to
the effective date of the amendment and that the new rate relates
only to those occurring on or after such effective date. Although
no action could lie until a death occurs, the essential wrong of the
defendant is complete when he has inflicted the injury which ultimately causes the death. It is a little irrational, therefore, to
choose the date of death as being controlling as to the measure
of recovery, but the defect in the law is one which will be cured
by the passage of time.
APPEAL AND APPELLATB PIIOCEDURE

A few cases have resulted in establishing doctrines relative to
appeals and appellate procedure. Jurisdiction to review errors of
trial courts depends, of course, on the fact that the judgment or
89 See Romine v. City of Watseka, 341 Ill. App. 370, 91 N. E. (2d) 76 (1950),
noted in 29 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 56.
90343 Ill. App. 404, 99 N. E. (2d) 363 (1951).
91 Laws 1951, p. 393, H.B. 222; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 70, § 2.
92 On that point, see Monroe v. Chase, 76 F. Supp. 278 (1947), and other comments
noted in 27 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 41, particularly note 88.
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decree must not be one entered by the consent of the complaining
party for, if so entered, the right to appeal is thereby waived.9"
That doctrine was urged, in McDavid v. Fiscar,94 as reason for
dismissing an appeal from a judgment entered on a motion to
strike a complaint. It appeared that the defendant had been
successful on his motion but did not seek a judgment dismissing
the suit. Plaintiff, being of the opinion that the complaint was
sufficient but realizing that the order entered was not of the
nature of a final judgment on which to base on appeal,9 5 voluntarily applied to the trial court for an order dismissing the suit
and an order of that character was entered. The Appellate Court
for the Third District refused to dismiss the appeal on the ground
it would be "too narrow and technical a construction of the rules
of law and procedure" to treat the judgment so entered as being
one entered by consent.
If an appellant finds it necessary to seek permission for leave
to appeal within one year, because of an excusable failure to take
an appeal as a matter of right within ninety days, the Civil Practice Act, and an accompanying rule of court, requires a "showing
by affidavit" of the merit in the claim and that the failure did not
result from culpable negligence." It was urged, in support of a
motion to dismiss the appeal in the case of Stone v. Stone,9 7 that
the affidavits presented were inadequate because containing no
more than a brief summary of the claim or merit, leaving the
rest of the details to be spelled out in the printed petition for
leave to appeal. The Supreme Court, while indicating that the
appellant could have made a more detailed statement in the
93 See Sims v. Powell, 390 Ii. 610, 62 N. E. (2d) 456 (1945). An "O.K.'d" order
may be enough for the purpose: City of Kankakee v. Lang, 323 Ill. App. 14, 54
N. E. (2d) 605 (1944), noted in 23 CmcAGo-KENT LAW R'vinw 25. But a consent
decree cannot limit the right of the state to seek review in a proper case, Massell
479, 89 N. E. (2d) 361 (1950), nor serve to limit in a private suit
v. Daley, 404 Ill.
where some public right may be affected: Nelson v. Nelson, 340 Il. App. 463,
92 N. H. (2d) 534 (1950).
94342 I1. App. 673, 97 N. E. (2d) 587 (1951), noted in 29 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
RLrv

357.

95 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 201, limits an appeal to cases wherein a
"final judgment, order or decree" has been entered.
96 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 200 and § 259.29.
97 407 In. 66, 94 N. E. (2d) 855 (1950).
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affidavit, refused to consider the affidavit insufficient or the method
of incorporation by reference to be improper.
The right of the Supreme Court to take jurisdiction over a
direct appeal would, according to two recent cases, have to depend on the state of the record at the time the notice of appeal
is filed in the trial court. In the first case, that of American

Smelting & Refining Company v. City of Chicago,98 the court, on
its own motion, raised the jurisdictional issue and ordered the
cause transferred when it appeared that, subsequent to the filing
of the notice of appeal, the defendant moved the trial court to
issue a certificate to the effect that the validity of a municipal
ordinance was involved, a fact which, in that case, was a prerequisite to the right to take a direct appeal to the Supreme
1
Court.9 9 In the other, that of Brehm v. Piotrowski, the record
showed that the plaintiff-appellant had filed a motion for leave to
amnend the complaint, so as to state the true agreement relied on,
but bad failed to get action thereon prior to decree and notice
of appeal. It was held that a nunc pro tuoic order, granted by the
trial court after the notice of appeal had been filed, was inadequate to correct the record hence, on the basis of the original
pleadings, it was necessary to affirm the decree denying specific
performance. While these holdings are not inconsistent with the

view taken in Bollaert v. Kankakee Tile & Brick Company,2 they
do raise a question whether the appellant should (1) take a chance
on being able to secure a correction of the record in the reviewing
tribunal, 3 or (2) withhold the filing of the notice of appeal until
he is certain the trial court record is in proper shape. The
latter course of action would seem to be the only safe one.
Not only must the appeal be taken in proper fashion and to
the right courtbut it must also be taken in apt time. Inasmuch
98409 Inl. 99, 98 N. E. (2d) 710 (1951).
99 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 199.
1409 1l1. 87, 98 N. E. (2d) 725 (1951).
2317 Ill. App. 120, 45 N. E. (2d) 506 (1942), noted in 21 CHICAGo-KENT 1.&W
RTviw 244. The Supreme Court, more nearly, could be said to be approving the
views expressed therein.
3 On that point, see Leffers v. Hayes, 327 Il1. App. 440, 64 N. E. (2d) 768 (1946).
But see also criticism thereof expressed in 24 CHICAGO-KENT LAW Rzvimv 262.
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as the commencement of the time period in which to appeal varies
in law cases from that view which is followed in equity matters,
the Supreme Court saw fit, in Freeport Motor Casualty Company
v. Tharp,4 to grant leave to appeal in order that it could settle the
question as to the point of commencement with reference to
declaratory judgment proceedings. It reached a conclusion that
suits of that type, while sui juris, should, for purpose of appellate
procedure, be treated as if they possessed the same character as
they would possess if they had been instituted for the purpose
of securing positive relief instead of a mere declaration of rights.
Since the particular controversy was analogous to a law action
based on a contract, the legal rather than the equitable rule was
applied to determine whether the appeal bad been filed in time. 5
ENFORCEMENT

OF JUDGMENTS

Although no significant cases pertaining to the enforcement
of judgments have appeared, attention should be called to the
fact that, by legislative enactment, a judgment creditor, his record
assignee, or his legal representative, who has received full satisfaction on his judgment, must execute and deliver a release of
said judgment when requested so to do by the judgment debtor
or his legal representative. On and after January 1, 1952, no
judgment shall be released of record except by such an instrument filed in the court where the judgment was rendered.
By
express wording, the last mentioned provision is denied retroactive effect.
7
Of even greater importance is the adoption of a new statute
modelled on the proposed Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act.8 Hereafter, a suit on a foreign judgment will no
4406 Ill. 295, 94 N. E. (2d) 139 (1950), noted in 29 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REviow
278, 39 Il. B. J. 261, and 26 Notre Dame Law. 353, affirming 338 Ill. App. 593,
88 N. E. (2d) 499 (1949). Fulton, J., dissented.
5 111. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 181.1(4), relating to declaratory judgment
proceedings, seems to authorize the possibility of differentiation for it permits of
jury trial on some issues while relegating others, presumably of equitable character,
for determination by the judge alone.
0 Laws 1951, p. 157, H.B. 228; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 77, § 66a.
7 Laws 1951, p. 1952, S.B. 480: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 77, § 88 et seq.
8 9 Unif. Laws Anno., pp. 376-83.
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longer be required before a local execution may issue, for issuance
thereof may be accomplished by registration of the judgment in
conformity with statutory requirements. The former remedy by
suit may still be utilized, if that is desired, for the new statute is
not made exclusive in character. The legislature has also increased the amount of wages exempt from garnishment by raising the figure to $25 in lieu of the former exemption of $20
heretofore prevailing. 9
IV. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Although there has been no noticeable decline in the number
of criminal cases handled by the courts, very little has been done
to change basic principles of substantive criminal law. The case
of People v. Liss,1 however, is noteworthy as it establishes a limitation upon the application of the statute relating to concealed
weapons. 2 Upon arrest of the defendant there concerned for
passing a stop light, the officer searched the automobile and discovered an automatic pistol pushed back about six inches under
the front seat and lying about mid-way between the front doors.
Defendant's conviction on an information charging that he unlawfully carried concealed weapons "on or about his person" was
affirmed by the Appellate Court for the First District but, on
writ of error to the Supreme Court, a majority of that court
agreed with defendant that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction because the pistol was not readily accessible,
it not being sufficiently "on or about" the person of the defendant to bring the case within the statute. The majority relied
upon the decision in People v. Niemoth 3 where a conviction of a
defendant who had carried loaded revolvers on the rear seat of
his car had been reversed on the theory that the revolvers were
not readily available because the defendant there could not have
9 Laws 1951, p. 1947, S.B. 221; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 62, § 14.
1406 Ill. 419, 94 N. E. (2d) 320 (1950), reversing 338 Ill. App. 657, 88 N. E. (2d)
334 (1949). Daily, J., wrote a dissenting opinion. Wilson, J., also dissented. See
also note in 26 N. Y. U. L. Q. 210.
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 155.
3322 Ill. 51, 152 N. E. 537 (1926).

